📰 SC backs summons to FB from Delhi govt. riots panel
Capital can ill afford another riot and social media platforms can influence vast sections, says order
•The Supreme Court on Thursday upheld the authority of Delhi Assembly’s Peace and Harmony Committee to summon Facebook India’s senior official Ajit Mohan in connection with the February 2020 communal violence, saying the Capital can ill-afford another riot, and the role of Facebook “must be looked into” in this context.
•“It is difficult to accept the simplistic approach adopted by Facebook — that it is merely a platform posting third-party information and has no role in generating, controlling or modulating that information,” a three-judge Bench led by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul observed.
•The 188-page judgment referred to how Facebook itself claims to be the most popular social media in India, with 270 million registered users. Social media platforms like Facebook have become “power centres” with the ability to influence vast sections of the public opinions, the court noted. These platforms are by no means altruistic in character. They employ business models that can be highly privacy intrusive. It compared Facebook to a “mass circulation media” with no or little editorial responsibility.
•“Facebook has acknowledged in their reply that they removed 22.5 million pieces of hate speech content in the second quarter of 2020 itself,” Justice Kaul, who authored the judgment, observed.
•Facebook cannot claim any “exceptional privilege” to abstain from appearing before the Peace Harmony Committee constituted by the Delhi Assembly. The court termed Mr. Mohan’s appeal in the apex court “premature”, saying no coercive action was taken or intended. The Committee merely wanted him to depose as a witness.
•The court lashed out at how the social media giant, by its own admission, appears only before committees which serve their commercial and operational interests. “But if their business interests are not served, they seek a right to stay away. Such a stand is completely unacceptable to us. Facebook has the power of not simply a hand but a fist, gloved as it may be,” Justice Kaul emphasised.
•The court rejected Facebook’s argument that the Committee had no jurisdiction over law and order in Delhi, and it was encroaching into the Centre’s turf.
•“The concept of peace and harmony goes much beyond law and order and police… The unfortunate communal riots led to the death of 53 persons, caused significant damage… The complexity of communal tensions and their wide-ranging ramifications is a matter affecting citizens of Delhi. It cannot be said that the Government of Delhi cannot look into the causal factors in order to formulate appropriate remedial measures,” Justice Kaul reasoned.
•The judgment said an “informed deliberation” by the Assembly’s elected representatives on the best measures to combat online mass hate and violence in their geographical jurisdiction was very much within the Committee’s competence.
•However, the court said the Facebook representative appearing before the Committee need not answer any query from the Committee directly regarding law, order and the police.
•The court dismissed Facebook’s argument that the Assembly ought to confine itself to making laws rather than enquire into the circumstances of the riots.
•“We cannot accept the plea that an Assembly must confine itself to the core function of legislation. This would be unreasonably restricting the role of an elected body… It is not only their concern but their duty to ensure that ‘peace and harmony’ prevails,” the court underscored.
•The court also declined a plea that the Committee had no power to summon “outsiders” or non-Members of the Assembly like Facebook.
•“Members and non-members can equally be directed to appear before the Committee and depose on oath,” Justice Kaul observed.
Government of India denies knowledge
•The Cairn Energy dispute with India over the settlement of a $1.2 billion award from The Hague, took a dramatic turn on Thursday, with the company saying it had secured a French court order allowing it to freeze at least 20 Indian properties in Central Paris.
•The Government of India, however, denied all knowledge of the latest order. It said it had filed an appeal against the tribunal decision of the Permanant Court at The Hague delivered in December 2020.
•“Government is trying to ascertain the facts, and whenever such an order is received, appropriate legal remedies will be taken, in consultation with its Counsels, to protect the interests of India,” a Finance Ministry statement said, stressing that no notice, order or communication had been received by the government from any French court.
•Earlier, a Cairn Energy spokesperson told The Hindu that the ball was in India’s court to stop the enforcement proceedings of assets.
‘For amicable settlement’
•“Our strong preference remains an agreed, amicable settlement with the Government of India to draw this matter to a close, and to that end we have submitted a detailed series of proposals to them since February this year,” the spokesperson said.
•“However, in the absence of such a settlement, Cairn must take all necessary legal actions to protect the interests of its international shareholders,” the spokesperson added in a statement.
•According to sources, the award by the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris was the “necessary preparatory step” to taking ownership of the properties and ensuring all proceeds from the sale of the properties would be accrued to Cairn Energy PLC as part of its efforts to enforce the award from The Hague in Cairns’ favour.
•While the Paris properties are estimated to yield about $23 million, Cairn sources had told The Hindu that they have identified assets worth about $70 billion in several jurisdictions that they could potentially attach through court orders.
•Cairn lawyers have registered The Hague award in courts in at least 10 jurisdictions including the U.S., the U.K., Netherlands, Canada , France, Singapore, Japan, the UAE and even the Cayman Islands.
In New York court
•In June, Cairn lawyers approached the court in the Southern District of New York, making the plea that Air India should be made liable for the outstanding settlement, and stating that other state-owned corporations could be targeted as well.
•Last month, some foreign investors in Devas Multimedia filed a similar plea in the same court, seeking to declare Air India as the Indian government’s “alter ego” and recover a $160 million compensation awarded to the firm after an international arbitration over its scrapped deal with ISRO’s commercial arm, Antrix Corporation.
•The government has until next week to file its challenge to the Cairn Energy plea in the New York court. Even as the tax dispute has snowballed into a tussle in international courts, both the Indian government and Cairn Energy said they were open to continuing talks over the issue.
•“Government has already filed an application on March 22, 2021 to set aside the December 2020 international arbitral award in The Hague Court of Appeal. Government of India will vigorously defend its case in Set Aside proceedings at The Hague,” the Finance Ministry asserted on Thursday.
•In December, the three-member tribunal in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled unanimously against the retrospective tax levied by India on Cairn in 2015. It ruled that the tax fell afoul of the bilateral investment pact between India and the U.K.
📰 A blip: On revenue collections of GST in June
This year’s restrictions by States have inflicted less economic costs than the 2020 lockdown
•Entering its fifth year, India’s Goods and Services Tax (GST) system reported a blip in revenue collections for June, breaking an eight-month streak of over ₹1-lakh crore in tax receipts. GST revenues tanked to a tad less than ₹93,000 crore last month — the lowest in 10 months — after a record ₹1.41-lakh crore in April and a relatively tepid ₹1.02-lakh crore in May. Generally, the June revenue reflects transactions that occurred in May. With the second wave of the pandemic in full flourish and States enforcing rigorous restrictions on most activities in May, the numbers are not really surprising. However, as May GST compliance dates for smaller taxpayers were extended till early July, some of this revenue also reflects April’s sales. Thus, the actual GST income attributable to May’s economic activity would be lower than June’s gross GST kitty. This is also reflected in the generation of e-way bills, which fell by a sharp 30% in May compared to April, while the sequential decline in revenues was not as steep. With caseloads declining over June and restrictions being pulled back gradually, revenues should pick up next month with 5.5 crore e-way bills generated in June from 3.99 crore in May. Despite the slowdown in May-June, GST collections in the Q1 of 2021-22 have been healthier than pre-pandemic levels, confirming that this year’s restrictions driven by States have inflicted less economic costs than the national lockdown at a few hours’ notice, in 2020.
•While the second wave setbacks have shaken up business and consumer sentiment, average monthly revenues of over ₹1-lakh crore — which Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has termed the ‘new normal’ for GST — could perhaps sustain through the year, if there is no dramatic resurgence of the pandemic and vaccinations are ramped up as promised. This should give some fiscal breathing room for the Centre and States, but neither can afford to sit back. Structural corrections in the GST regime and the inclusion of petroleum and electricity may take longer, but there is enough that needs immediate attention. Industry has sought temporary rate cuts on some sectors to spur demand. It is plausible that a volume pick-up could make up for resultant revenue losses, just as an uptick in petrol consumption creates room for a revenue-neutral duty cut on fuels. The GST Council must be reconvened soon to take up such ideas to prod the economy’s rebound, apart from holding the promised special session to discuss all the brewing concerns related to States’ compensation. Delaying this will not only foster greater misgivings between the Centre and the States but also make it tough for States to plan their borrowings for the rest of the year. Clarity is also needed urgently on when the ₹1.58-lakh crore of back-to-back borrowings for States in lieu of compensation dues will begin. If the Centre plans to raise ₹5,000 crore a week, like it did last year, it will take roughly 32 weeks to complete such borrowings; so, any delay beyond early August may not be viable.
📰 Should only elected legislators be eligible for chief ministership?
The option provided in the Constitution should be used with honesty, not just to tinker with politics
•The sudden exit of Tirath Singh Rawat as Chief Minister of Uttarakhand, a development the Bharatiya Janata Party sought to explain in terms of a constitutional roadblock to being elected as a legislator within six months, has led to thickening speculation about the fate of West Bengal’s Mamata Banerjee, another unelected Chief Minister. In a conversation moderated by Abdus Salam, M.R. Madhavan and S.Y. Quraishi thread through precedents and procedures as all eyes are firmly fixed on the Election Commission of India (ECI)’s next moves. Edited excerpts:
Should Chief Ministers be mandatorily picked from the pool of elected MLAs? Or at the very least, should a Member of Parliament resign immediately from the House if picked to lead a State?
•M.R. Madhavan: Let’s look at it from the first principles of how the Constitution is. We have a parliamentary democracy, which essentially means that whoever has the confidence of the majority of the members of the Lok Sabha, in the case of the Centre, will be the Prime Minister. It also requires that all Ministers should be a Member of Parliament (MP) or get elected within six months. Rather, it puts it in negative terms. Anybody who is a Minister and is not an MP for six months automatically stands to be disqualified from the administration. It visualises the Chief Minister as being elected by the members of the House of their own free will. And it assumes that the Chief Minister is a member. There are, of course, exceptional circumstances, especially for Ministers. Let me mention the fairly non-controversial case of Dr. Manmohan Singh in 1991 when there was a crisis, and Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao wanted him as the Finance Minister. Was that for the national public good? In hindsight, we would say yes. In the case of a Chief Minister, it becomes slightly dicey. There is a party high command, especially in the case of national parties, which decides who will become the Chief Minister. Effectively you have removed the whole concept of the person being the popular choice of the elected people. So, the Chief Minister is an indirectly elected person by the directly elected members. But now the Chief Minister dictates how each of those persons will vote, because with the anti-defection law, we have weakened that accountability mechanism drastically. What is the way out? Not very clear.
•The second part of your question is much clearer. If you look at various other parts of the Constitution, it’s clear that the Constitution expects a person not to hold more than one constitutional position at a time. If you look at Article 101, it says that if a person is a member of both Houses of Parliament, he or she loses membership of one; if a person is an MP and gets elected as an MLA, or vice versa, he or she has about 14 days to resign from one.
•When you are an MP and become the Chief Minister, you are the head of the executive of that State. So, what is your primary role? Is it to vote as a Member of Parliament? Or is it to be in the State and attend the State’s legislature and be accountable to it? In that at least, we should definitely amend the Constitution to say that if you are going to be the Chief Minister or a Minister of a State, you should resign your membership of another House before taking up the role. That is, one should not occupy two constitutional offices concurrently.
•S.Y. Quraishi: Whether it’s a good thing or a bad thing is not the issue for us to decide, because the framers of the Constitution provided for this fresh air coming from outside, if need be, with the condition that within six months they need to get elected. It’s a good provision and I feel we don’t need to tinker with it because it does restrict options. Of course, this option should be used intelligently and with full honesty, and not just to tinker with politics. And it should be used sparingly.
So, you want the door to remain open for lateral entry. Coming specifically to Tirath Singh Rawat’s case, was his election as MLA a constitutional impossibility?
•SYQ: He could have easily contested the election. Didn’t he anticipate that he would have to get elected in the thick of COVID-19? To say that in the time of COVID-19 it will not be advisable to conduct elections and therefore I’m resigning is a very flimsy excuse. It is some kind of a deeper political calculation. It’s a build-up for something more serious, to create the precedent for West Bengal [bypolls] whereas the entire West Bengal [Assembly] election was held during COVID-19. And the Bihar election was held during COVID-19, and it was very well done. The ECI issued guidelines for COVID-19 before the Bihar election, which were beautiful. By then, it had the global experience of 70 countries which had conducted elections in the thick of COVID-19 and done them very well, [to learn from]. India learnt a lot from all of them, and then formulated its own guidelines. Having conducted a bigger election, what stopped the ECI from conducting a by-election in Uttarakhand? My feeling is that a scene may be created where by-elections won’t be held. This should not create a precedent — that it would be dangerous to hold a by-election.
Mamata Banerjee has four months left to get elected as an MLA. Several Opposition leaders have suggested that Mr. Rawat’s case portends a similar predicament for her. Is there reason for her to worry?
•MRM: The constitutional position is clear, right? If she doesn’t get elected, she can’t be the Chief Minister. It is the job of the ECI, and not of anyone else, to ensure that there is no constitutional crisis. Let’s visualise the general election circuit for the country. In the case of a State, the Constitution still permits stopgap things like President’s Rule. What would you have done for general elections if they were due this year in the middle of the pandemic?
•SYQ: I hope my apprehension is just an imagination and that it doesn’t turn out to be correct, because the election must be held. Otherwise, there will be a constitutional crisis. And it will be humanly created rather than being a gift of the Constitution. After all, a huge election was conducted recently and all went well. But in West Bengal, public meetings were happening. We were all expressing our concern then: ‘What the hell is happening? Why are you allowing such huge meetings?’ Surprisingly, the Prime Minister, instead of getting concerned looking at those crowds, in violation of his own guidelines for the whole country, was showing his excitement like a child. Those public meetings were the only undesirable thing; they should have been banned. They were eventually banned, but that decision should have been taken earlier. With the COVID-19 guidelines and their implementation ensured, there is nothing to stop the ECI from conducting the by-election for Mamata Banerjee. There should be a ban on public meetings because that is the only security risk of COVID-19. Nobody has any reason to complain because the rules apply to all parties.
Given the extraordinary circumstances of a pandemic raging since early 2020, should we as a polity be flexible on constitutional and legislative deadlines?
•MRM: I would say that you cannot defer the elections; you’ll have to pull them off in some manner. The U.S. did that. If you say that under extraordinary circumstances, the constitutional requirement of parliamentary elections in five years could be deferred, then you will find people figuring out ways to create extraordinary situations more and more often, and these situations will become ordinary.
•The ECI has the choice, because if an election is not held, it leads to a constitutional crisis. And the ECI’s job is to ensure that there is no constitutional crisis instead of creating one. Under Section 151 of the Representation of the People Act, it is provided that if only one year is left of a House, a by-election will not be held. But it is actually at the discretion of the ECI to make an exception. And it has been making an exception only for the Chief Minister. Because in a House of 200-300, about three-four vacancies are always there. The government being allowed to fall because the ECI says it cannot hold an election... that would be the very unbecoming of the Commission. Now, in Section 151, a subsection provides that the ECI in consultation with the Central government certify that it is difficult to hold the by-election within the set period. I hope we don’t read into that.
There’s also the question of institutional resilience. What more can be done to insulate bodies such as the ECI from being seen as susceptible to external pressures?
•MRM: There’s a legitimacy of a government being formed in a free and fair election, and everybody subscribes to that. If that legitimacy is undermined, we are in deep crisis. What does the legitimacy rest on? It rests on public belief and public trust in the ECI holding free and fair elections. The ECI has been a very trusted institution for a fairly long time now. Is that public trust getting bigger or not? That’s a big question.
•SYQ: The ECI has a constitution designed for it to be insulated from the government. Which is why once appointed, the Chief Election Commissioner cannot be removed except through impeachment. Now, there are two reforms that we have been shouting for. The Commission is appointed by the government of the day without consulting the Opposition. It is a different matter that all the Election Commissioners appointed through this route performed very well. And we hope that it will continue to happen. But hope is not a strategy, a system has to be in place. Nowhere in the world does such a situation exist. In some countries, there is scrutiny by Parliament. In some cases, the candidates are interviewed by Parliament. The systemic change we are pleading for is that appointments should be through a collegium. And promotions should be automatic, on the basis of seniority. Second, the removal procedure of the two Election Commissioners. They are not protected, so they feel they are on probation. They’re always looking over their shoulder to see if the government is happy with them or not. That fear is absolutely dangerous and disastrous. So, that protection has to be provided. Government after government has not paid any heed to this extremely important and critical issue. And even the Supreme Court has not claimed the issue, despite its grave importance.
•MRM: Today, the CBI [Central Bureau of Investigation] Director is appointed by a committee which includes the Chief Justice of India, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. Is the ECI far more fundamental and important an institution than the head of the CBI? Obviously, yes. This would also provide greater authority to the Commission because appointments would be made after an agreement across political lines. The Central Information Commission is not a constitutional body, it is a statutory body, but appointments are through a collegium. The CBI is not even a constitutional or statutory body. Why do we have our priorities upside down?
📰 Tracking fugitives everywhere
In the absence of a coordinated database, criminals can go undetected
•Indian law on extradition is spread across the Indian Penal Code as well as various laws pertaining to narcotic drugs, Information Technology, hijacking, and so on. Procedural laws have the Code of Criminal Procedure as their backbone but there are other laws too, such as the Extradition Act, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Prevention of Money Laundering, and so on.
Investigation and prosecution
•The bulk of the investigation and prosecution work happens at police stations in the States, while Central agencies take up the important cases. Central agencies have developed reasonable expertise because they are focussed only on investigation and prosecution work, whereas State police forces (except specialised wings) are engaged in law-and-order work as well as investigations. There is a tendency to close investigations once the accused have absconded, and an overwhelming tendency to bank on statements obtained from the accused or during interrogation before closing investigations. It would be interesting to know what proportion of arrest warrants obtained by investigation agencies of States pertain to persons who have absconded or are ‘wanted’, whether within India or abroad. Some police stations do initiate proceedings for attachment of property and declaration of the accused as proclaimed offenders, but the number of cases where coordinated efforts are made to pursue fugitives – domestically or internationally – are hardly documented. If the number of Red Corner Notices issued are of any indication, only about 750 such criminals are wanted by Indian agencies. The number of Blue Corner Notices issued is about 300.
•Theoretically there exists a system of tracking criminals worldwide – through Interpol Notices and the sharing of immigration databases of different countries – but there is no coordinated system or database for tracking criminals or wanted persons domestically. In the absence of such a system, it is relatively easy for criminals from one police station/jurisdiction to melt into the population in any other area, almost undetected.
Requirements
•The creation of a nationwide database of wanted persons, which could be accessible for police agencies, the public and others (like passport and immigration authorities), is imperative. The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems and the National Intelligence Grid are efforts in the right direction, but more integration is desirable. Perhaps a nation-wide system of ‘Wanted Persons Notices’, similar to Interpol Notices, is required, to help track fugitives domestically. Countries like the U.S. have functional inter-State extradition and fugitive tracking systems; India needs to set up such dedicated ‘fugitive tracking units’. There needs to be enhanced integration between immigration agencies, State police agencies, Interpol-New Delhi, the External Affairs Ministry and Home Ministry and central investigation agencies. Intelligence agencies also need to pool in.
•What may also help India plug loopholes is sharing its ‘wanted’ database or providing access to it to foreign embassies on a reciprocal basis or through treaties or arrangements. All this will help detect possible plans of criminals to abscond abroad.
•Signing of more bilateral and multilateral conventions on criminal matters would help plug legal infirmities. Signing bilateral agreements on cooperation in policing matters would also help. All relevant legal processes and requirements should be incorporated into one consolidated law on international cooperation.
•The entire gamut of activities pertaining to fugitives, from investigation to extradition, needs to be incorporated into a specialised set-up with an Integrated International Cooperation Division (IICD) at the top. The IICD should have linkages with proposed fugitive tracking units at the State level. This would ensure that requisite expertise and forward-and-backward linkages are created. Making systems watertight would deter criminals from hoodwinking the law.
📰 Troubling prospects in Afghanistan
As the reality of the U.S. withdrawal takes hold, the future will depend on Taliban-Kabul dynamics and Pakistan’s role
•Last week, on Friday, the United States handed over the Bagram airbase to the Afghan authorities, marking a symbolic end to its military presence, as U.S. forces complete their withdrawal well ahead of the September 11 deadline, announced by American President Joe Biden on April 14. A familiar air of uncertainty surrounds Kabul as the Afghans ponder over the future of their land, ravaged by conflict for nearly 50 years. Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours are now faced with a new challenge — how to persuade the Taliban against overplaying their military hand?
A costly misadventure
•Could anyone have predicted when the U.S. commenced its military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 that it would get embroiled in an endless war for 20 years and to exit safely, it would have to negotiate with the Taliban, the same entity that it went in to punish?
•It has been a costly lesson. The war effort has cost $980 billion, over 2,400 U.S. soldiers (plus 1,144 allied troops) and 388 private military contractors have lost their lives. It also spent $143 billion on reconstruction; about $90 billion went for the Afghan army, police and other security forces, $36 billion for governance and economic development activities (the rest of the international community contributed an equivalent amount) and the balance on counter-narcotics and humanitarian relief works.
•Yet, the real price has been paid by the Afghans. The 20-year war has claimed the lives of nearly 50,000 Afghan civilians and nearly 70,000 Afghan security forces (a majority during the last seven years); add to it another 60,000 Afghan Taliban, and the scale of the Afghan human loss becomes evident.
•There have been gains too. In 2001, there were 9,00,000 boys in school. Today, eight million children attend school and a third are girls. Literacy is up from 12% in 2002 to 35%; life expectancy from 40 to 63 years. Urbanisation is 26% and 70% of the population watch TV. From 320 miles of paved roads in 2002, today, tarred roads cover 10,000 miles. Infant mortality rates are down from 20% by over half. With a median age of 18.5 years, a majority of Afghans have grown up in a post-Taliban era. Today, they bear the brunt of 130 daily Taliban/IS Khorasan (IS-K) attacks, the highest since the U.S. ended combat operations in end-2014. Tomorrow, even these limited gains are at risk.
Taliban gains legitimacy
•For U.S. President Bush, the objective was “to build a stable, strong, effectively governed Afghanistan that won’t degenerate into chaos”. As the U.S. shifted from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency, shades of Vietnam began to emerge. To Hamid Karzai’s credit, he saw the writing on the wall when he protested about the night-raids and warned the Americans “to either take the fight to the safe havens and sanctuaries across the Durand Line or make peace with the Taliban” but it only soured his relations with the U.S.
•Eventually, U.S. President Barack Obama diluted the objective to “preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for global terrorism”. He oversaw a successful operation to eliminate Osama bin Laden in 2011, implemented an unsuccessful military surge concluding with an end to combat operations in end-2014 and Taliban opened the Doha office in 2013.
•U.S. President Donald Trump saw himself as a deal-maker and in 2018, initiated direct negotiations with the Taliban. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad (U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation) began by setting out four elements — a ceasefire, cutting ties with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, intra-Afghan peace talks, and, a withdrawal of all foreign military forces, declaring that “nothing is agreed till everything is agreed”. Within months, the Taliban had whittled down the U.S. demands till it got what it wanted — a withdrawal timeline not linked to the other factors. In addition, the Taliban managed to get the U.S. to push the Kabul government to release over 5,000 Taliban cadres in custody. In short, the U.S. ended up legitimising the Taliban at the expense of the government in Kabul that they had worked to create and support.
•U.S. President Joe Biden was no stranger to the Afghan dossier. He was convinced that the U.S. had to exit from its quagmire of “forever wars”. The U.S. may have decided that it had no military options but the Taliban are still pushing ahead militarily.
•From less than a fifth, today, over a third of Afghanistan’s over 400 districts are under Taliban control. The day after the exit from Bagram, 13 districts, in Badakhshan, Takhar, Paktia and Kandahar fell to the Taliban, adding to the 50 that have fallen since May. In many cases, the locals manning the security posts and checkpoints have just surrendered. From villages and towns, there is already a move towards the cities. Intra-Afghan talks in Doha have been in limbo for months.
Questions about the future
•Gen. Austin S. Miller, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, indicated in a recent press conference, “Civil war is certainly a path that can be visualised if it continues on this trajectory.”Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, warned on June 30, “The truth is, today the survival, security and unity of Afghanistan is in danger....”
•Ironically, the most vocal critics of the U.S. overstaying in Afghanistan and hinting that the U.S. would never leave are the ones now blaming the U.S. for a hasty and irresponsible withdrawal.
•In coming months, as uncertainties mount, there will be increasing Taliban presence in the countryside as the Kabul government concentrates on ensuring security in urban areas and of the road networks. The Taliban military strategy has been to target districts that enable them to surround provincial capitals. The clutch in the northeast including Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz and Baghlan enable them to control the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border and the Wakhan corridor that links to China. In the east, they exert control in Ghazni, Zabul and Paktia while the Haqqani network is active in Khost and Paktika, and the IS-K in Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman. Further south, the Taliban control large parts of Kandahar, Helmand and Farah (bordering Iran).
•As the reality of the U.S. withdrawal takes hold, how events unfold by end-2021 depends on three factors. First, have the Taliban changed their ideological colours? The U.S. in recent years, and Pakistan for much longer, have been pushing this line but the Taliban leadership have given no clues about it. Related to this is the question of Taliban unity. Distances have grown between the Quetta shura, the Doha negotiators and the fighters who want to guard their individual preserves. This works as long as everyone is pursuing the military option, but when it comes to power sharing, who calls the shots? Or, does it lead to no power sharing?
•Second, can the Kabul regime present a unified front? If the leaders in Kabul and the government continue sniping at each other, it will adversely impact the integrity of the chain of command of the Afghan security forces. If opportunistic leaders are tempted to strike their own deals with the Taliban, it will only hasten the collapse, and even western funding will dry up.
The Pakistan factor
•Finally, is Pakistan still seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan or has it realised that a Taliban-dominated Kabul will be a magnet for its own home-grown extremists as well as those from the neighbourhood? Can it persuade the Taliban that its legitimacy will be at risk unless it shares power? Pakistan’s influence will weaken once the Rehbari Shura decides to move back from Quetta to Afghanistan.
•History tells us that in Afghanistan, there have only been winners and losers, seldom any lasting compromises.
