📰 Third stealth frigate of Project 17A Taragiri launched in Mumbai
•Taragiri, the third stealth frigate of the Project 17A, was launched on Sunday by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd. (MDL) here.
•The ship has been built using integrated construction methodology which involves hull blocks construction in different geographical locations and integration/erection on slipway at MDL.
•The keel of Taragiri was laid on September 10, 2020, and the ship is expected to be delivered by August 2025.
•The vessel is being launched with an approximate launch weight of 3,510 tonnes and is designed by the Indian Navy’s in-house design organisation — the Bureau of Naval Design.
•The MDL had undertaken the detailed design and construction of the ship which was also overseen by the Warship Overseeing Team (Mumbai).
•The first ship of Project 17A, Nilgiri, was launched on September 28, 2019, and is expected to begin sea trials in the first half of 2024.
•According to the officials, the estimated cost of Project 17A is around ₹25,700 crore. The second ship of P17A class Udaygiri was launched on May 17 this year and is expected to start the sea trials during the second half of 2024. The keel of the fourth and the final ship was laid on June 28.
•The ship, 149.02 metre long and 17.8 metre wide, is propelled by a CODOG combination of two gas turbines and two main diesel engines which are designed to achieve a speed of over 28 knots at a displacement of approximately 6,670 tonnes.
•The steel used in the hull construction of P17A frigates is an indigenously developed DMR 249A which is a low carbon micro alloy grade steel manufactured by the SAIL.
•Officials said that the indigenously designed Taragiri will have a state-of-the-art weapons, sensors, an advanced action information system, an integrated platform management system, world class modular living spaces, a sophisticated power distribution system and a host of other advanced features.
•“It will be fitted with a supersonic surface-to-surface missile system and the ship’s air defence capability is designed to counter the threat of the enemy aircraft and the anti-ship cruise missiles would revolve around the vertical launch and long range surface to air missile system,” the officials added.
📰 This was Chile’s ‘disaster in the making’
There are lessons from the Chilean constitutional fiasco, and wiser counsel must prevail the second time around
•The overwhelming rejection of a new constitutional text by Chile’s electorate (over 60% voted against it) has made worldwide headlines. International public opinion is baffled. The Chilean constitutional process has been followed with great interest around the world. Although there were many protests in 2018 and 2019, both in Latin America and elsewhere, the only case in which these protests led to an institutionalised process to renew the country’s social contract was Chile.
A difficult phase
•This meant that, after the violent, unprecedented uprising that took place on October 18, 2019, that led to the burning of churches, looting of supermarkets and the destruction of 118 subway stations, a national agreement was signed by most political parties on November 15 of that year. This included a timeline on the way forward to a new Constitution to replace the one inherited from General Augusto Pinochet, a charter which, after 40 years, continues to rule Chile.
•This timeline included a plebiscite on whether to draft a new Constitution, and by whom; an elected Constitutional Convention (a first in Chilean history) that met for a year to do so; and a final plebiscite (on September 4) to ratify the new text. This period overlapped with the COVID-19 pandemic, which wrought havoc with the established schedule; a sharp recession; and a slew of additional municipal, regional, congressional and presidential elections. At the elections held in May 2021, there were 15,000 candidates on various ballots, in a country of 19 million people.
•Under these circumstances, the very fact that the Constitutional Convention managed to deliver a text within the established deadline, was a bit of a miracle. The fact that its delegates were elected on the basis of gender parity, and that there was a quota of 17 delegates for Chile’s long-ignored indigenous peoples (the 1980 Constitution does not even mention them, though they form 13% of Chile’s population, and two-thirds of Chileans are of mixed European-aboriginal descent), also marked a first. Chile is a highly conservative, patriarchal society that has for long ignored its indigenous roots.
The outcomes
•Yet, why was the new text rejected?
•And Chile is very much an outlier in this. In the past two centuries, 94% of all new constitutional texts submitted to the electorate have been approved. Also, in Chile, four out of five voters in 2020 supported a new fundamental charter. With Chile´s long-standing democratic institutions and civic traditions, it would surely manage this easily, and deliver a text that rose to the occasion, right? Wrong.
•And the reasons for this, and for why the country is now forced to go back to the drawing board, have as much to do with form as with substance, with processes, as with outcomes.
•In the October 2020 plebiscite, voters were asked to choose between a fully elected Constitutional Convention, and one where half the members would be elected, and the other half made up of MPs. Much as the electorate on that occasion voted overwhelmingly (80%) in favour of a new Constitution, it was also endorsed by almost the same majority, having a full, newly elected body to draft it. And this is how Constitutional Assemblies are supposed to work. The era of a small group of unelected white men in smoke-filled rooms writing made-to-measure charters for the government of the day (which is how Chile’s 1980 Constitution was written over seven years) is past.
•And then, a critical turning point was reached. When the time came to choose a formula to elect the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Chile’s Congress did so along the lines of Congressional districts (thus the 155 delegates, which is the number of MPs in Chile’s Chamber of Deputies). Independents cried out, arguing that they would be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis candidates of political parties. Traditionally, independents have been accommodated in various ways, including allowing them to run as part of a political party.
•This time, however, the Chilean Congress, giving in to what it took to be the esprit du temps, made a cardinal mistake. In setting the election rules for the Constitutional Convention, it allowed independent candidates to form party lists (the ultimate oxymoron), and run under their banner. A motley crowd thus gathered under lists with picturesque names such as the “People’s List” and the “Non-Neutral Independents”.
•At a time when popular support for political institutions in general and political parties in particular were at an all-time low, these lists won many votes, while political parties did not do so well. Christian Democrats, who have had three Presidents in Chilean history, famously elected only one delegate.
•The net result of this misguided feat of electoral engineering was that the motley crowds that formed the lists of independents, plus other Left delegates, won a two-thirds majority in the Convention. This allowed them to elect the chair, to ignore the right-wing delegates and whatever they proposed, and otherwise engage in the sort of shenanigans individuals not accountable to anybody are bound to. One of them video-taped himself, while voting remotely, from the shower; another, who was almost elected as chair of the Convention, faked a non-existent cancer, which he parlayed not only to get votes but also to raise funds. Identity politics and victimhood took centre stage, while narcissism ran amok.
•The first three or four months of the convention were wasted in endless deliberations about the fate of the “political prisoners” (those in prison as a result of crimes committed during the social uprising ) and in extended exchanges on the Convention’s internal procedures. The media, never very fond of the whole exercise in the first place, had a feast. Amazingly, the Convention initially decided not to invite four of Chile’s former Presidents to the closing ceremony. Although the Convention began with high approval ratings, by the time it was done, public opinion had turned against it.
•Once the seven specialised committees began their work, time was short, and the text ended up being more an exercise in hopeful wishing than anything else. The abolition of Chile’s two-centuries old Senate, the weakening of the judiciary, and the establishment of a powerful “Congress of Deputies”, seemingly designed ex profeso to clash with the Executive, are part and parcel of an odd smorgasbord of offerings that betray little understanding of how political systems work.
Faultlines
•Yes, the 388-article, somewhat repetitive, text of the new Constitution, that would have been one of the longest in the world, left much to be desired. The shift from totally ignoring Chile’s aboriginal peoples, to proclaiming the country to be a “plurinational state” with separate judicial systems, was too much of a good thing. Ignoring the proposals of the Right, and not aiming for a charter that represents all Chileans was a cardinal sin.
•But the key lesson of the Chilean constitutional fiasco is a different one. Good intentions are fine and well, but procedures and professionalism matter. In fact, it may make the difference between failure and success. In twisting rules designed for political parties in order to favour independents who are accountable to no one, the Chilean Congress opened the door for the ‘disaster in the making’ that was Chile’s Constitutional Convention. Let us hope that the second time around wiser counsel prevails.
The contributions of the Sheikh Hasina government to nurturing the special ‘bonding’ need to be acknowledged
•The state visit of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina, to India (September 5-8) has amply showcased the high stakes of both polities in their bilateral ties, imbued with regional significance. Delhi and Dhaka are fully conscious that they must get this vital equation right, constantly strengthening and deepening their cooperation and countering the challenges they face. Only then can this relationship be convincingly projected as a major success for their foreign policies. Even before reaching New Delhi, Ms. Hasina underlined the importance of the special “bonding” between the two nations, where one helped in the liberation of the other, and where both have worked together closely, especially since Ms. Hasina came to power again in 2009.
Dhaka’s expectations
•In one of her most candid interviews given just prior to her visit, Ms. Hasina vividly recalled how India had helped her all the way when she faced the greatest personal tragedy of her life: the assassination of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and a number of other members of her family. It was a national catastrophe. The shelter, security and support extended by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and subsequent governments shaped Ms. Hasina’s worldview and her perception of India. As Prime Minister, she reciprocated the gestures adequately by taking firm action against anti-Indian insurgent groups soon after assuming power. Since then, the two governments have successfully resolved several old problems such as the exchange of conclaves and the conclusion of long-pending land and maritime boundary agreements. But other challenges remain.
•Four specific issues seem to trouble the Bangladeshi side. First, the continued presence of 1.1 million Rohingyas who fled from Myanmar in 2017 has created enormous pressure on the economy and social harmony. Ms. Hasina has said India is a big country that should “accommodate” them. Further, she wants stronger support from India to facilitate their early return to Myanmar. Second, the absence of agreement on sharing of the Teesta’s waters, pending since 2011 due to West Bengal’s refusal to relent, and the broader issue of joint management of 54 common rivers, have been constant grievances. Third, India’s sensitivity to growing cooperation between Dhaka and Beijing rankles the authorities in Bangladesh. Ms. Hasina has stressed the point that if there were differences between India and China, she did not wish to “put her nose to it”.
•Four, she has conceded that despite her government’s secular policy, “incidents” against the Hindu minority have occurred, but her government has acted against miscreants. At the same time, she has expressed concern about the safety of minorities in India, pointing out that “it is not only (in) Bangladesh, even in India also sometimes minorities suffered”.
•The context above helps to evaluate the outcome of Ms. Hasina’s latest India visit. She last visited India in 2019. She played host to the Prime Minister and the President of India, when they visited Bangladesh in March and December 2021, respectively. The visits marked triple epochal celebrations: the birth anniversary of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of Nation; the golden jubilee of Independence; and 50 years of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Bangladesh. These visits were utilised to reach new agreements and add further content and momentum to the relationship. India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar tweeted, “The warmth and frequency of our leadership level contacts is a testimony to our close neighbo[u]rly partnership.” This process has continued unhindered. The latest visit resulted in seven agreements designed to increase cooperation in the diverse domains of water sharing, railways, science and technology, space, media and capacity building.
Specific outcomes
•Indian officials identified several specific outcomes of Ms. Hasina’s discussions with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. First, there was the agreement “to continue close security cooperation” over counter-terrorism, border crimes, and border management. Second, the two sides recommitted themselves to enhancing their development partnership which is already quite extensive and multi-faceted. Third, they agreed “to build resilient supply chains” between the two countries and “across the region”. A significant decision was to launch the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2022 and to conclude negotiations by the time Bangladesh graduates from least developed country status in 2026. Finally, the leaders favoured expanding connectivity through more rail, road, inland waterways, and coastal shipping linkages. They agreed to build on the impressive successes achieved in the past decade in this sphere.
•Economic relations have been developing excellently. Bilateral trade has touched a high watermark of $18 billion. Logistics for power trade between Bangladesh and its neighbours — India, Nepal and Bhutan — have been put in place. India will assist Bangladesh by sharing its rich experience of innovation through startups.
•About the issues flagged by Ms. Hasina, has there been progress? On the displaced people from the Rakhine state (the word ‘Rohingya’ was not used in deference to Myanmar’s sensitivity), India expressed appreciation for Bangladesh’s “generosity” in sheltering them, made an assurance of more material assistance, and reiterated its previous position to support their “safe, sustainable and expeditious return”. India is unable to do more. As expected, there was no resolution of the Teesta question, but in a significant forward movement, the two governments agreed on the sharing of the waters of the Kushiyara, the common border river. They also agreed to exchange data on other rivers, set up their priorities and begin formulating the framework for “the interim water sharing arrangements”.
•The thrust of the discussion on China-related issues, if it took place at all, is not known. When pressed by the media, India’s Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra observed that the strategic priorities, interests, and concerns have all been “factored in our cooperative matrix of engagement”, stressing that this bilateral relationship stands “on its own merits”. The question of the safety of minorities did not find a place in the joint statement, but Dhaka routinely reiterates its commitment to protecting the Hindus in Bangladesh.
Sobering ground realities
•In India, there are continuing worries about the cumulative and adverse impact of COVID-19 and the Ukraine war on Bangladesh’s economy. The country faces escalating protests on the streets that have been triggered by a sharp rise in fuel prices, an erosion of foreign currency reserves, and a deepening financial crisis. Besides, the rising influence of fundamentalist forces, extremism, and radicalisation poses a serious danger to political stability. Thus, the contours of combined challenges before the Sheikh Hasina government as it faces parliamentary elections in 2023 become clear.
•It is for Bangladesh citizens to elect their next government, but they should know that the contribution of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League government to building a strong relationship with their largest neighbour is enormous and widely appreciated in India. Their leaders have jointly crafted and nurtured “a role model for bilateral and regional cooperation”. It deserves to be protected and strengthened, whatever the future may hold.
📰 The tedious process of adoption
What laws determine adoption rules in India? Why is referring cases to District Magistrates cause for concern?
•From September 1, District Magistrates (DM) have been empowered to give adoption orders instead of courts. All cases pending before courts have to be now transferred.
•The revised rules have parents, activists, lawyers and adoption agencies worried as cases already before courts for the past several months will have to be transferred and the process will have to start afresh. The Central Adoption Resource Authority says there are nearly 1,000 adoption cases pending before various courts in the country.
•Adoptions in India are governed by two laws — the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA) and the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.
•The story so far: From September 1, District Magistrates (DM) have been empowered to give adoption orders instead of courts. All cases pending before courts have to be now transferred. Hundreds of adoptive parents in the country are now concerned that the transfer process will further delay what is already a long and tedious process. There are questions whether an order passed by the executive will pass muster when an adopted child’s entitlements on succession and inheritance are contested before a court.
What do the amended rules say? How did they come about?
•The Parliament passed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Bill, 2021 in July last year in order to amend the Juvenile Justice Act (JJ Act), 2015. The key changes include authorising District Magistrates and Additional District Magistrates to issue adoption orders under Section 61 of the JJ Act by striking out the word “court”. This was done “in order to ensure speedy disposal of cases and enhance accountability,” according to a government statement. The District Magistrates have also been empowered under the Act to inspect child care institutions as well as evaluate the functioning of district child protection units, child welfare committees, juvenile justice boards, specialised juvenile police units, child care institutions etc.
•The Act and the corresponding rules came into effect from September 1. The amendments to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 say, “all the cases pertaining to adoption matters pending before the Court shall stand transferred to the District Magistrate from the date of commencement of these rules.”
Why is there concern over the revised rules?
•The revised rules have parents, activists, lawyers and adoption agencies worried as cases already before courts for the past several months will have to be transferred and the process will have to start afresh. A petition for adoption orders is filed after a parent registers for adoption, who is then assessed through a home study report, referred a child and subsequently allowed to take a child in pre-adoption foster care pending an adoption order. A delay in such an order can often mean that a child can't get admission into a school because parents don't yet have a birth certificate, or like in one case, parents unable to claim health insurance if a child is admitted to a hospital.
•The Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA) says there are nearly 1,000 adoption cases pending before various courts in the country. Parents and lawyers also state that neither judges, nor DMs are aware about the change in the JJ Act leading to confusion in the system and delays. According to CARA, the Ministry of Women and Child Development is drafting a letter to be sent to State governments clarifying that where adoption orders have already been given, or will be given shortly, the DMs should consider them valid. But there are also larger concerns.
•"District Magistrates don't handle civil matters that bestow inheritance and succession rights on a child. If these rights are contested when a child turns 18, a judicial order is far more tenable to ensure the child is not deprived of his or her entitlements." says Nilima Mehta, former Chairperson, Child Welfare Committee, Mumbai.
What is the adoption procedure in India? What are the challenges?
•Adoptions in India are governed by two laws — the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA) and the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. Both laws have their separate eligibility criteria for adoptive parents.
•Those applying under the JJ Act have to register on CARA’s portal after which a specialised adoption agency carries out a home study report. After it finds the candidate eligible for adoption, a child declared legally free for adoption is referred to the applicant. Under HAMA, a “dattaka hom” ceremony or an adoption deed or a court order is sufficient to obtain irrevocable adoption rights. But there are no rules for monitoring adoptions and verifying sourcing of children and determining whether parents are fit to adopt.
•There are many problems with the adoption system under CARA but at the heart of it is the fact that there are very few children in its registry. According to the latest figures there are only 2,188 children in the adoption pool, while there are more than 31,000 parents waiting to adopt a child which forces many to wait for upto three years to be able to give a family to a child. This allows traffickers to take advantage of loopholes in HAMA. These concerns were also highlighted by a Parliamentary panel in August in its report on the "Review of Guardianship and Adoption Law", which recommended a district-level survey of orphaned and abandoned children.
•According to Nilima Mehta, what is needed is a “child-centric, optional, enabling and gender-just” special adoption law like in other countries. “HAMA is a parent-centric law that provides son to the son-less for reasons of succession, inheritance, continuance of family name and for funeral rights and later adoption of daughters was incorporated because kanyadaan is considered an important part of dharma in Hindu tradition. As far as the JJ Act is concerned, the law handles issues of children in conflict with law as well as those who are in need of care and protection and only has a small chapter on adoptions,” Dr. Mehta explains.
•In 2015, the then Minister for Women and Child Development Maneka Gandhi centralised the entire adoption system by empowering CARA to maintain in various specialised adoption agencies, a registry of children, prospective adoptive parents as well as match them before adoption. This was aimed at checking rampant corruption and trafficking as child care institutions and NGOs could directly give children for adoption after obtaining a no-objection certificate from CARA. But the new system has failed in ensuring that more children in need of families are brought into its safety net.
•“Yes, there was a need to check malpractices and improve monitoring. But in the new system the soul in adoption is gone. The human contact, bonding and psychological preparedness has been taken away. Therefore, parents may look at other ways to adopt a child.” One other dangerous repercussion of this is that in the past few years, there is an increasing number of disruptions and dissolutions, where children are returned after an adoption is formalised.
📰 We need civil society engagement in Kashmir
This alone can create confidence, restore trust and strengthen inter-community bonds
•Over the last six months, the targeting of Kashmiri Pandits and other Hindus in the Valley by militants has once again brought forward the question of their right of return as well as the safety of minorities living in the Valley.
•After the Pandit exodus from the Valley in the 1990s, the first few years of this century saw government efforts to send Pandits back to the Valley. The United Progressive Alliance, under the Prime Minister’s return and rehabilitation of Kashmir migrants scheme, created government postings in the Valley for Kashmiri Pandit “migrant” youth. Mostly teachers, these government employees have lived in protected high-security enclaves, but their work requires them to leave these enclaves and mingle with the rest of the population. This had posed no threat to their lives until last October. Another segment, known as “non-migrant” Pandits because they never left the Valley, has lived in their own homes, without state-provided protection. Both sections feel vulnerable now due to the new incidents of violence against members of the community. The threat of a second exodus of the Pandit community has loomed on the horizon since last October. When, and in what circumstances, can Kashmiri Pandits expect to return and live without fear, without barbed wire walls, alongside Kashmiri Muslim neighbours? Can the pain and bitterness between the two communities ever be healed, trust restored, and the relationship between the Pandit and Muslim communities be rebuilt?
The importance of dialogue
•In two decades of working in Jammu and Kashmir as a member of the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation (CDR), I have learned that there is no top-down solution to the complex question of return. The government can enable it, but individuals and civil society will need to create conditions on the ground. They will have to encourage people to give up the blame game. Individuals or communities will have to search their hearts for where they have wronged the other, and build courage to acknowledge mistakes and restore trust.
•Based on this, CDR supported the initiative for a dialogue proposed by two prominent young Kashmiris — one a Muslim and the other a Pandit — who had decided not to join the 1990s exodus. Both men had lived in Kashmir through the violence of the 1990s and the subsequent decades. Their sharply different perspectives on the incidents of that decade could have ended their initial conversation. But they decided to listen and talk to each other. Their conversations led them to persuade their larger communities that talking could lead to healing. It led to CDR’s ‘Shared Witness’, a Pandit-Muslim dialogue series, in December 2010.
•Public intellectuals and other influential persons from both communities were participants. The dialogue series coincided with the launching of the Prime Minister’s job scheme. These dialogues created a social environment that enabled Kashmiri Pandits to take up government postings in the Valley. They focused on the events in and around 1990, and the incidents that triggered the displacement of the Pandit community. The conversations were difficult and emotional. Yet, no one left the table.
•By the third dialogue, participants were sharing individual experiences that did not fit into the narrative that each community had built about the other. In that room, good and bad personal experiences were shared and tears shed — the lived reality of what happened in the early 1990s. There are similar stories of Partition — stories of cruelty and killings of thousands, but also stories of individuals and families who helped, rescued and protected people.
•The conversations dived into the heart of communal differences. Participants pointed out that interdependence was not peculiar to Kashmir and was grounded in wider cultures; myths should not be created about an imagined past of communal “togetherness”; and relations between Pandits and Muslims in Kashmir could be described as “living together but separate”. Was religion the primary basis for the separateness? And were class and power centrally imbedded in the relationship between the two communities? The word ‘hatred’ was used repeatedly. What then could be the “minimum principles of engagement” towards reconciliation?
The issue of apology
•The Muslim participants felt the Pandits were in denial of the struggle of the Muslims in the Valley, who were facing violence from the system. The Kashmiri Muslim was always portrayed as being misguided, aided and abetted by Pakistan. The protest in Kashmir was not against religion, but against structures of power and oppression. Pandits were aggrieved that the Muslims did not protest the Pandit killings, not even when the killers claimed them. That greater responsibility lay with the Muslims as they were the majority.
•The issue of “apology” was also discussed. One Kashmiri Muslim said the violence perpetrated on Pandits was committed by people not chosen by him to represent the Kashmiri cause. Why should he apologise for the crimes of others? Other Muslim participants jumped in to say an apology was appropriate to acknowledge the failure of civil society to avert the exodus of the Pandits from the Valley. This failure was one of the most difficult conversations in the dialogue. And this question remains most relevant to the situation of Kashmir in 2022. One Muslim participant forcefully said civil society had failed then, acknowledged his personal failure in the matter, and said Kashmiris had to pay a heavy price for this subsequently. If some social organisations had acted quickly, the exodus could have been stopped. He also reassured the Pandits that they were not alone anymore. This had the effect of changing the atmosphere in the room immediately.
•A respected Kashmiri Pandit public intellectual observed that the Pandit community too had suffered from a lack of leadership. At the time, senior political and intellectual figures in the community should have met and taken stock of the situation, and reached out to leading figures in the Muslim community. If this had happened, the exodus could have been prevented. Second, even after migration, a good leadership might have prevailed upon members of the community not to sell their properties in the Valley in a hurry.
•The Pandits asked the Muslims, what kind of freedoms do you want? Which freedoms do you not have under the existing system? But they also acknowledged the need to understand why Kashmiri Muslims had these demands. There was a strong demand for cultural, economic, political safeguards for the Pandits’ return. They discussed the possibility of setting up a ‘Truth Commission’.
•The reason I am writing about this dialogue so many years later is to show that attempts at healing were made during the past decade and can be made. Unfortunately, some of the gains have now been lost. We need an urgent civil society engagement between communities in Kashmir once again. This alone can create confidence, restore trust and strengthen inter-community bonds. It could also enable Pandits to fulfil the long-cherished dream of return — in peace and with dignity.
📰 The crisis of apple farmers
The increasing cost of production and the increase in GST on cartons has triggered protests in Himachal Pradesh
•Apple growers in Himachal Pradesh are out on the streets some three decades after their last big agitation. The protests are not surprising; their anger has been simmering for a while.
•To understand the present crisis, it is crucial to understand the developments of the last few decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, the state provided a lot of support to apple production in Himachal Pradesh: it set up nurseries and gave plants to farmers on a large-scale, offered a transport subsidy on cartons, provided heavy concession on tools, and offered special monetary help for the poor and Dalits to plant apple orchards, among other initiatives. Land reforms were widely implemented since the inception of the State; hardly anyone was left landless. Even before statehood was granted, land was distributed through Nau Taur (breaking new land). Any land tilled was eventually transferred to those tilling them, through successive land settlements. Laws in the State restrict the transfer of land in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist of Himachal Pradesh. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, peasant movements were successful in raising the support prices for apple. However, in the 1990s, with rising fragmentation of land, low productivity and withdrawal of state support, agriculture became unsustainable. The cost of production of agricultural items increased substantially, denying remunerative prices to the poor and marginal growers.
Reasons for crisis
•There are two major reasons for the current crisis. The first is the increasing cost of production. The input cost of fertilizers, insecticides, and fungicides has risen in the last decade by 300%, as per some estimates. The cost of apple cartons and trays and packaging has also seen a dramatic rise. In the last decade, the cost of a carton, for instance, has risen from about ₹30 to ₹130. The cost borne to market the produce has also risen.
•The second and immediate trigger for the agitation was the increase in the Goods and Services Tax on cartons from 12% to 18%. This was done to ensure that farmers are forced to sell their produce to big buyers instead of selling it in the open market. Just as the three farm laws were designed on the pretext of getting rid of the middlemen, the argument here was that commission agents, who fleece the apple growers, will be forced to exit the picture. But this leaves the apple growers at the mercy of large giants in procurement, who have precedence of even deciding the procurement price.
•Large players do not buy apples in cartons; they procure them in plastic trays and decide the rate on the basis of kilogramme. By doing this, they argue that the cost of packaging gets reduced. It is true that it does — in the open market, the price is decided on the basis of an apple carton. In this manner, the big players induce the apple farmers to sell the produce to them. But there is a catch. Unlike in the open market, where apples of all varieties/grades are procured, the large players only procure apples of high quality. Such apples don’t constitute even 20%-30% of the total production in a harvest. So, what happens to the rest of the apples? There is no answer.
•As soon as the big players declare their procurement rates, they crash the market and bring in a substantial fall in the procurement prices across the market even though they don’t procure even 5%-7% of the total produce. Unlike in Jammu and Kashmir, where there is a minimum rate for procurement, there is no such law in Himachal. The government also does not seem prepared to bring in such a law. The farmers are demanding that legally guaranteed procurement at a Minimum Support Price (C2+50%) should be ensured to improve their condition.
Need for a regulator
•The government seems to be functioning under the pressures of big buyers. It doesn’t seem to have the capacity to tame the market or even decide what should be the minimum procurement prices for apples of different grades. What is required is an independent body that is duly supported and trusted by the farmers. Such a body should have representatives of apple growers, market players, commission agents and the government. This must be a statutory body that is also given the task of conducting research in the apple economy. If this is not done, the economy of over ₹5,500 crore will be severely hit. The big growers or the rich peasants will be able to buffer the pressure, but the small and marginal apple growers will be impacted deeply and thrown out of this ecosystem. The big growers have also started to shift from the conventional varieties to more genetically modified varieties called the spur, most of which are imported from European nations. How this transformation will unfold is yet to be seen.
